Germantown and the Roads to Valley Forge Read online

  That was the moment when Sir William Howe suddenly realized that despite the warnings, he had been caught by surprise, and this was an all-out, full-scale attack by the American Fabius. Howe “rode off immediately full speed, and we joined the two brigades that were now formed a little way in our rear,” Hunter wrote, “but it was not possible for them to make a stand against General Washington's whole army, and they all retreated to Germantown.”114

  Capt. Archibald Robertson of the Engineers drew a detailed map of the action, which was sent to King George III for his map collection at Windsor Castle. The map shows the two other picket posts to the right of the 2nd Light Infantry, one on the Abington Road (Washington Lane) and the other a few hundred yards below on the Bristol Road (Haines Street). A contingent of the 46th Regiment, including Lt. Loftus Cliffe, made up one of these pickets, commanded by Capt. Matthew Johnson. “The 4 October, about Day break, Morning foggy, a firing commenced upon the 2d Battn of Light Infantry who were advanced in line of our Picketts,” Lieutenant Cliffe told his brother Jack. The volume of gunfire “continued encreasing to become serious,” and as it became evident that a major attack was underway, “the Picketts were then ordered to support them.” Cliffe stated. “I was on Picket and happily had Captain Johnson & Lt. [Alexander] Cameron with me, two steddy Soldiers.” Johnson had trained his company to rise and fall on signals from a whistle to avoid enemy volleys, like a light infantry company. Cliffe, though, couldn't believe his own eyes: “We who were a good distance on the right of the Light Infantry, moved towards them and see them quite broke, flying like Devils.”

  It may well have been Howe's voice bellowing through the fog and smoke that caught Cliffe's attention. “We heard the Word, ‘stop, Light Infantry, stop!’ which made us wait, expecting they would rally, when a devil of a fire upon our front & flank came ding dong about us.” Definitive identification of who was firing is elusive, but since the 46th companies were moving toward the Light Infantry, the fire on the picket's front may have come from the 2nd Pennsylvania Brigade in Wayne's Division on the far left of Sullivan's column. With little or no opposition in front of it, that brigade was advancing rapidly and continually outflanking the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion.

  The musketry on Cliffe's flank probably came from Stephen's Division, the far right wing of Greene's column. Greene was about forty minutes behind schedule, which would have brought some of his troops to the scene at about the same time that the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion broke and ran. The Virginians could hear the shooting on their right intensify as they moved up the Lime Kiln Road.

  Greene had five brigades with his column: from right to left, Woodford's and Scott's, in Stephen's Division; Muhlenberg's and Weedon's, in his own division; and McDougall's Connecticut Brigade on his left. Captain Robertson's map shows five distinct American columns coming down crossroads between the Lime Kiln Road and the Germantown High Street on a front nearly a mile and a half wide, with only the two British picket posts and the 40th Regiment between the 1st and 2nd Light Infantry Battalions. Gen. Adam Stephen wrote, “The first party of them that we discovered was to our left; against them I detached Col. Mathews,” of the 9th Virginia Regiment, which was in Muhlenberg's Brigade in Greene's Division, not Stephen's, “who was nearest to me & advancing with Spirit,” indicating that Stephen himself was positioned between the two divisions at that moment. From Scott's Brigade on the right of Muhlenberg, “to Support him I ordered Major Dark [William Darke] with part of the Eight Regiment,” the 8th Virginia, “Sent an Aide de Camp with him, & Charged him to Attack the Enemy in the Rear if possible.”115

  The maneuver was effective on the small British outpost. At the 46th Regiment's picket, “We had but 60 Men, could not cope, were obliged to fly,” Cliffe reluctantly admitted. “For the first time I ever saw the 46th turn, but alas it was not the last that Day, the engagement became general.”116

  As the battle was developing at Mount Airy and Sullivan's column was pushing towards Germantown, Gen. John Armstrong's column of Pennsylvania Militia arrived in front of the Jäger pickets above Vanderin's Mill on the British far left. “My destiny was against the various Corps of Jermans encamped at Mr. Vanduring's or near the Falls,” Armstrong told President Wharton. “Their Light Horse discovered our approach a little before sunrise.”117

  At the Jäger encampment behind the mill near the Falls, “Colonel von Wurmb himself went up and down the camp and called out, ‘Jägers, be alert!’” Lieutenant von Feilitzsch wrote as the distant sounds of gunfire echoed down the Wissahickon gorge. “Although everything was still quiet where our outposts were, the Colonel soon had us take up our arms, and shortly thereafter we heard besides the cannons, also small arms fire, which was constantly coming closer.”

  A patrol of mounted Jägers was dispatched across the bridge at Vanderin's Mill. “As soon as they had moved up the hill on the opposite bank of the Wissahickon, they noticed the enemy marching briskly,” Lieutenant von Feilitzsch observed. “They withdrew quietly and sent the fastest horse back to camp with the report.” As the horseman returned to camp, in his excitement he broke a basic rule of discipline. “This Jäger called out already from afar, using the expression, ‘the rebels are coming in like sand in the sea,’ for which he got 30 lashes after the battle,” the Anspach lieutenant noted.118

  Captain Ewald confirmed, “Towards daybreak on the 4th, one of my patrols ran into the enemy a quarter of an hour [less than a mile] away and withdrew under constant fire to the defile I had to defend.” As the foot Jägers on picket duty were already in position, “I immediately ordered the rocky heights occupied from the left bank of the Schuylkill along the ravine and bridge, which were at Vanderen's Mill, and awaited the enemy,” Ewald stated. “About six o'clock he attacked the pass with two thousand men and several guns under General Potter.”119

  Despite being heavily outnumbered and outgunned, the Jäger pickets tried to hold their position. Their commander, Lt. Col. Ludwig von Wurmb, told his superiors in Cassel, “My position, unsupported as the Minnigerode Grenadier Battalion was located almost two miles from us,” up on the plain between the Falls of Schuylkill and the village of Germantown, “was attacked by General Potter and his brigade.” Advancing the main body of Hessian and Anspach Jägers toward the Wissahickon, “I immediately moved out to reinforce my pickets at a bridge,” von Wurmb reported. “The enemy's cannonade forced us to retreat from the bridge and occupy a height,” the steep slopes of the Wissahickon Gorge just below the School House Lane leading to Germantown.120 Ewald wrote, “I held out at this post until the end of the engagement.”121

  “At daybreak we heard our pickets fire,” Lieutenant von Feilitzsch of the Anspach Jägers noted in his diary. The Anspachers were in the main Jäger camp, across the Wissahickon and behind Vanderin's Mill. “We moved out at once and then heard a heavy cannonade on the army's right wing toward Germantown,” the sounds of Sullivan's column engaging the Light Infantry. Closer in front, on the Ridge Road above the Wissahickon, “The enemy drove our pickets back; we moved forward,” von Feilitzsch continued. “The enemy fire against us from both cannons and small arms was heavy. We answered ineffectually with our rifles because we were too far from them.”122

  The Jäger rifles were short-barreled and of large caliber. Though of longer range and considerably more accurate than a common musket, their effective range was about 200 yards. The riflemen with the militia were armed with Pennsylvania long rifles, which were of smaller caliber and varied in length according to the preference of the owner, but were usually longer than the Jäger rifles; some were upward of six feet long. Not only did the Pennsylvania rifles typically have a longer range—300 or more yards was not unusual—the militia were on steep, high ground, anywhere from 100 to 150 feet above the creek, firing down on the German positions at the bridge and beyond.

  “We cannonaded from the heights on each side of the Wissihickon,” General Armstrong wrote, “whilst the Riflemen on opposite sides acted on the lower ground
.”123 Pennsylvania Militia Dragoons from the small but excellent 1st Troop of Philadelphia Light Horse accompanied Armstrong's column. “The morning was so dark from the heavy fog from the river & from Vandeerens dam that General Armstrong who was first on the ground with his troops, could not make an attack on the Hessians with any certainty,” Trooper John Donnaldson recalled. “Only about ten of the Troop were with him at this time, some skirmishing took place & some of the troop reconnoitering made prisoner of a Hessian Lieutenant & brought him off.”124

  A desultory battle of sniping and skirmishing, with occasional cannonading across the gorge, continued here over the next three hours. The firing was noisy but largely ineffective due to poor visibility. The main body of militia did not attempt to push across the creek to storm the heights, but it did succeed in keeping the Hessians out of the main battle, as Washington intended.

  In the meantime, over on the high road at the entrance to Germantown itself, the main drama of the battle was about to unfold. Captain von Münchhausen saw Sir William Howe fruitlessly try to take personal control of his collapsing front. By that time, the Light Infantry were in full flight, abandoning their two six-pounders on the road near Cliveden. “Upon orders from my General, who was here, the 40th regiment arrived at this very critical moment,” von Münchhausen stated. “Colonel Musgrave, who commanded it, saw the light infantry and the 5th regiment falling back toward him, whereupon he detached half his regiment forward to support the retreating troops.”125

  The 40th Regiment had listed 320 men embarked in July for the voyage; 313 men were listed as provisioned at Head of Elk in early September; and the unit suffered one man wounded at Brandywine.126 At Paoli, Musgrave led the 40th and 55th Regiments to the Paoli Tavern, but did not engage in any fighting. The commander of the 40th Light Company, Capt. William Wolfe, was killed in the battle, but he was with the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion and not with Musgrave's force. By early October, the eight battalion companies of the 40th probably numbered about 300 men fit for duty. How many were actually present for the battle and not on detached duties is unknown, but the surviving evidence suggests six companies numbering about 200 men available.127 The unit was good enough, though, to be placed a mile ahead of the main camp to support the Light Infantry and other pickets in case of attack.

  “The light infantry ammunition being almost expended, Col. Musgrave, who commanded the 40th regt. and had been sparing of his ammunition, told the light infantry that he would cover their retreat,” a British officer reported, “which he did in a most masterly manner, till he arrived at his old encampment,” which was behind Cliveden. The light infantrymen informed the 40th that the Americans were giving no quarter and bayoneting every British soldier they caught.

  Some of Musgrave's troops were on the Germantown High Street and in the fields immediately east of the street, falling back to the front and side lawns of Cliveden, with Conway's Brigade and Wayne's Division coming toward them. Soon, “the rebels were in the encampment of the 40th regt., and colonel Musgrave found himself entirely surrounded, and all means of retreating cut off.” Since the Pennsylvanians were not taking prisoners, “he immediately ordered his regiment to get into a large stone house (which had been his quarters) with the greatest expedition possible, but the rebels pressed so close upon their heels, that they must inevitably have entered the house at the same time, if he had not faced the regiment about and given them a fire, which checked them enough for him to have time to get his regiment into the house and shut the door.”128

  Standing at the entrance of Germantown, Cliveden was one of the largest buildings in the village and fairly new, built in 1767 as the country house of Chief Justice Benjamin Chew. It was also arguably the most elegant: two-and-a-half stories on a raised basement, with a finished attic and probably some type of observation deck on the back roof.129 Seven large stone urns imported from England perched on the corners and peaks of the roof, and assorted classical statuary, including four full-length marble statues mounted on pedestals, ornamented the grounds.

  Like most of Germantown's buildings, Cliveden was solidly built of Wissahickon schist, a locally quarried light gray stone glimmering with particles of mica. The front façade was nearly two feet thick, constructed of large ashlar blocks carefully cut and laid in courses, with finely cut stone window sills and flat, keystoned arches. The back and side walls were formed with randomly laid rubble stone finished with layers of sand-colored stucco scored to resemble cut stone. The interior was spacious and elegant, with high ceilings and wide hallways, fine paneling and woodwork, and a grand staircase gliding up to the second floor through a pillared hallway. The stairway was lit by a full-size back window on the landing.

  Outside, the house was symmetrically flanked in the back by two small detached dependencies, a kitchen and laundry, also built of rubble stuccoed and scored on the front to match the main house. A stuccoed blind wall complete with windows connected the kitchen with the main house, shielding a back “piazza” or porch. Graceful classical woodwork formed the exterior cornices and main doorway, and the interior was finished with some of the finest examples of carpentry in the region.

  A stone barn and carriage house stood about fifty yards northeast of the mansion. Down the lawn in front of the property, a low stone wall ran along the Germantown High Street, and a driveway, lined with cherry trees according to one account, approached the house asymmetrically up the front lawn to the left of the building. A small, formal garden with ornamental shrubs was found in the back, fenced in with paling.

  Musgrave had been using Cliveden as his headquarters, and his regiment was camped behind the garden in the back. “I presume that General Howe, seeing the advantageous situation of the house, upon high ground, descending every way, and cleared all round, posted Musgrave there with orders to occupy the house in case of attack,” John Eager Howard speculated. “If he did he certainly shewed his military judgment.”130 Howard, who married Peggy Chew after the war, visited the house many times and knew it well. Adj. Gen. Timothy Pickering stated, “With its ‘massy walls’ Musgrave had probably become well acquainted while encamped in its neighborhood; and, as an able and experienced officer, knew it was proof against the light field artillery.” It was no accident that the 40th went into the house; “in other words,” Pickering reasoned, “Musgrave threw his troops into that house, because he knew it was tenable.”131 Pickering speculated that the house must have been prepared beforehand, since the attack came so swiftly that the 40th would not have had time to secure the first floor.

  Light infantrymen did not carry much ammunition with them. They were supplied with “belly boxes”—small cartridge boxes worn on the front of their waistbelts, which held a dozen or so rounds—or small shoulder boxes. The amount of gunfire that came from the house and the length of time that the 40th ultimately spent defending their position (upward of two hours) strongly suggests that large amounts of ammunition were stored inside before the battle began.

  Cliveden was a place for the Chew family to escape the heat and stench of Philadelphia summers, and while there may have been a tenant or caretaker living somewhere on the property, there is no evidence of anyone living in the house when the battle took place. For security when vacant, Cliveden had thick, solid-paneled wooden shutters that locked from the inside on all of the first floor windows, and the basement windows were small and barred. “This house of Chew's was a strong stone building and exceedingly commodious,” Pickering wrote, “having windows on every side, so that you could not approach it without being exposed to a severe fire.”132 There were three outside entrances: two tall, narrow, solid-panel French doors centered in the front entry, flanked by elegant Doric pilasters (half-pillars) supporting a classical pediment and opening into the hallway; a shorter, solid-paneled heavy back door opening under the stairway landing opposite the front entrance; and another paneled door at a servants’ entrance on the north side near the kitchen, opening to a narrow service stairway that went to the attic
.

  Once inside, the troops closed and locked all of the shutters and doors; “the three entrances to the building could be barricaded only with tables and chairs, due to the rapid advance of the enemy.”133 Musgrave then placed “a certain number of men at each window, and at the hall doors, with orders to bayonet every one who should attempt to come in; he disposed of the rest in the two upper stories, and instructed them how to cover themselves, and direct their fire out of the windows.”134 A few men went up onto the roof; others went down into the basement to fire out between the window bars.

  Most accounts of the battle state that Musgrave took six companies into the house with him, but others say that only three companies were there. A number of sources indicate that only part of the 40th went into the house, and the accounts giving numbers agree that about 100 men (Robert Morton, who went up to the house the next day, says 120) went inside Cliveden. Captain Ewald stated that “the three companies which had defended the house consisted of one hundred men at the most, since the regiment had suffered a great deal in the campaigns,” referring to their loss of nearly 100 men at Princeton, when part of the regiment barricaded themselves inside Nassau Hall, another large, stone building.135 Contemporary sources mentioning specific names of men and officers in the house confirm the identity of three companies: Lt. Col. Thomas Musgrave's, Capt. William Harris's, and Capt. Samuel Bradstreet's.136

  As Musgrave and his troops filed into Cliveden, the Marylanders were steadily advancing on the other side of the high street. “I pushed on through their encampment, their tents still standing,” Major Howard recalled, “and in the road before we came opposite to Chew's house, took two six-pounders, which I supposed were those that had been with the picket, but as the dragropes had been cut and taken away, we could do nothing with them.”137 Major Miller of the 1st Pennsylvania stated that “the artillery, &c., which had first fallen into our hands,” could not be moved, “they having stabbed their horses.”138