Germantown and the Roads to Valley Forge Read online

  For some time, Washington had been looking for an opportunity to turn the tables on Sir William Howe and launch an attack. “Although defeated at the Brandywine, and foiled in several smaller encounters, our American Fabius retained his full determination to give these hostile invaders no repose,” Maj. Benjamin Tallmadge of the 2nd Continental Light Dragoons wrote of this period.5 Given the forces at his disposal and his opponent, Washington's Fabian tactics were a necessity, but at times a political liability. “I am sick of Fabian Systems in all Quarters,” John Adams had told Abigail at the beginning of September. “The Officers drink a long and moderate War. My Toast is a short and violent War. They would call me mad and rash &c. but I know better. I am as cool as any of them and cooler, too.” He confided to her, “I wish the Continental Army would prove, that any Thing can be done. But this is sedition at least. I am weary, I own, with so much Insipidity.”6

  Capt. Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee differed slightly in his view of classical analogies. “Cautious as Washington undoubtedly was, his caution was exceeded by his spirit of enterprise,” Lee wrote of his commander, longtime friend, and neighbor. “He resembled Marcellus rather than Fabius,” the old cavalryman stated years later, alluding to another Roman general, Marcus Claudius Marcellus (ca. 268–208 BC), who had attacked a poorly guarded enemy position, “notwithstanding his rigid adherence to the Fabian policy during our war.”7

  Two councils of war during the last week of September saw the American generals vote against attacking the British Army. While the verdict was unanimous in the first council on September 23, the council on September 28 had five commanders in favor, while ten voted against an immediate attack. “But they advise that the Army should move to some Grounds proper for an Encampment within about 12 Miles of the Enemy, and there wait for a further Reinforcement, or be in readiness to take advantage of any favourable Opportunity that may offer for making an Attack.”8

  That opportunity came in early October as Washington moved the army to Methacton Hill (called “Metuchen Hill” in many accounts) at mile 21 stone on the Skippack Road. A captured British courier carried information that a few days earlier, on September 29, Howe had detached the 10th and 42nd Regiments, nearly 1,000 troops, and sent them from Germantown to Chester, where the main fleet had finally come up the Delaware. These units were to cross the Delaware to seize an American fort under construction at Billingsport, below Fort Mercer.

  To gather more intelligence, on September 30 Washington instructed Brig. Gen. Casimir Pulaski, the recently appointed commander of the Continental Light Dragoons, to “immediately form a detachment of at least fifty Horse of which part are to be Colo. Moylans in their Red Uniforms, which will serve to deceive both the Enemy and Country people.”9 The captured red coats with blue facings had already caused confusion among some civilians. “Fear tack'd wing to my feet,” sixteen-year-old Sally Wister wrote in her journal on September 25 when red-coated dragoons rode up to the farmhouse above Whitemarsh where she and her family had taken refuge from Germantown. “The officer was Lieutenant [William] Lindsay, of Bland's regiment, Lee's troop,” she told her friend Debby Norris. “The men, to our great joy, were Americans, and but 4 in all. What made us imagine them British, they wore blue and red, which with us is not common.”10

  Col. Joseph Reed, Washington's former adjutant general, and Gen. John Cadwalader of the Pennsylvania Militia (both of whom were ranked as generals by Congress and were referred to as such, though they declined to serve in that capacity) were extremely active and daring in gathering information. They, too, apparently went out in red uniforms, which in one extraordinary episode saved their lives and gained them a good horse in the bargain. Christopher Marshall's son Benjamin, who lived near Norriton, wrote to his father on October 1, “the Generals, Read and Cadwalader, being out on a scout the thirtieth [of September], called at the house of Thomas Lewsley [Livezey], a miller,” whose mill on Wissahickon Creek was about a mile west of the 2nd Light Infantry post at Allen's house. Livezey, “not knowing them, told them that those two Generals”—themselves, Reed and Cadwalader!—“were but a little way from there, and that if they (as he took them for two of the British Light Horse) would pursue, they might easily take them, for which end he gave them a very fine horse, which they brought away.” Christopher Marshall also noted, “My son on the back of his letter, dated First instant [October 1], says, ‘just now a British Light Horseman passed here a prisoner, taken last night with despatches of consequence to General Howe, and is sent with them to General Washington.’”11

  After meeting with Joseph Reed to coordinate reconnaissance, Moylan wrote to Washington on October 1, “I shall send out scouting parties from hence round the enemy's lines, and if any intelligence worth your notice can be picked up, shall be transmitted to you.”12

  Some of the local people passed on helpful information about the British positions. “Enclosed is a paper in German, which was put into one of my dragoon's hands by a friend,” Moylan told Washington. “He says it contains the situation of the enemy at Mount Airy and Germantown; their picket is not strong at Mr. Allen's.”13 One of the British officers stationed there, Lt. Richard St. George of the 2nd Light Infantry Battalion, would have agreed. “We are always on the advanced Post of the army,” he wrote on October 2. “Our Present one is unpleasant—our Left too open & unguarded,” referring to the very area where Reed and Cadwalader had narrowly avoided capture two days before.14

  Some of the information in the note, such as “the chief of their artillery is on the Schuylkill Road,” was erroneous, as the main park of the Royal Artillery was in the middle of Germantown; however, “their outposts there [at] Vanderen's Mill” was correct, for that was the main Jäger post. “I believe they are further advanced on that road,” Moylan continued, “as I saw some Hessians this morning half a mile at this side of Vanderen's,” an accurate description of the Jäger picket's location on Ridge Road north of the Wissahickon.15

  Additionally, and unknown to Washington as he made his plans, the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, another 300 men of an elite unit, were sent from Germantown to Philadelphia on October 3 to form a guard at the Middle Ferry and assist in keeping the supply route open between Chester and Philadelphia. With these troops out of the Germantown camp, as well as the 3,000 British and Hessian grenadiers in Philadelphia, the 2,000 Scots and Hessians at Wilmington, and the cumulative casualties so far in the campaign (between 1,000 and 2,000), the Americans estimated that the Crown Forces remaining in Germantown numbered about 8,000.

  Howe had effectively cut his forces in half. From Washington's perspective, not only were the numbers good, but the quality of the troops not present at Germantown was significant. While the two British Light Infantry battalions, the Hessian Jägers, and the Brigade of Guards remained, many of Howe's best troops—all of the British grenadiers and most of the Hessian grenadiers; the 42nd and the 71st, two large Highland regiments totaling over 1,500 men; and the Welsh Fusiliers—were elsewhere.

  The general mood in the British camp was one of complacency. At the Jäger position on the far left flank, “The picket stood at the bridge across the Wissahickon at Van Dering's Mill, where this creek flows into the Schuylkill,” Lieutenant von Feilitzsch of the Anspach Jägers wrote on September 29. “Everything bound for the left flank of the army therefore had to come in through this pass. As a precautionary measure, I had this bridge barricaded with old wagons, tables and lumber during the night, to be safe from an ambush.”

  The ethnic mix of the local people was evident at Vanderin's Mill. “The miller and his son spoke German, but his wife and her daughter did not understand a word of it,” von Feilitzsch noted. He also observed, with a sly grin, “the latter was the most beautiful girl I had ever seen; they invited me to come to see them when I was not busy with my duties, and the girl promised to teach me English.” Not wishing to miss an opportunity to build good relations with the local people, the lieutenant wrote the next day, September 30: “Because
everything was quiet today, I paid a visit and began to learn English.”16

  On October 1, “Everything remained quiet,” von Feilitzsch noted. “It appeared as if we would remain here a long time.” Privately, he expressed a sentiment seconded by many: “I wish to Heaven the campaign were finished and that we would have the very much wished-for peace, and that in the coming spring we will be able to return to our fatherland in Europe.”17

  Over on the right flank, in the Guards camp on the Old York Road a few hundred yards behind Stenton, things had been very quiet since the occupation of Philadelphia. Lt. Col. Sir George Osborn took the time on September 30 to write a long letter to his brother John, the British minister to Saxony stationed in Dresden. In addition to blithely describing the course of the campaign, Sir George included several optimistic observations of events, unaware of the impending military disaster involving his uncle, Sir John Burgoyne. “As for the future situation of this war, if Genl. Burgoyne can come down to Albany and we shall be able effectually to drive Washington beyond the Susquehannok, I think we shall conclude the war this winter,” Sir George predicted. “Compare my last letter with this, you will find my speculations pretty just. I think now that a garrison only will be left at Philadelphia, I hope, well fortified with Redouts, and that we shall send an expedition in the beginning of October to assist the progress of the Northern Army from Albany.” On a personal note, he added, “My health is so good that my friends make me quite a proverb. Colonel Harcourt is likewise perfectly well, [as are] Col. Monckton, Capt. Fitzpatrick and Sir John Wrottesley.”

  Nothing in Sir George's letter gave the least hint of any concern about Washington's forces other than chasing them even farther into the wilderness. In a postscript written on October 10, he informed John about his success with another family and personal passion, horses: “Hardly anybody is better mounted in this army in most respects than I am. The mare mentioned in the enclosed letter is one of the prettiest I ever had.” Abruptly, almost offhandedly, he then mentioned, “Washington attacked us in this camp on the 4th but was repulsed with a very considerable loss. We had 400 killed and wounded, the Guards who were expected to suffer the most lost but three privates.”18 Just as abruptly, he went on to other topics. Two sentences, that was all Sir George wrote about the battle, in a letter several pages long; even after “The Surprize of Germantown,” as one British map labeled it, there still didn't seem to be much cause for concern about Washington or his attack plans.19

  The plan of attack was ambitious and complex; far too complex, as many professionals noted afterward. With 8,000 Continentals and 3,000 militia available at that moment, the round numbers were slightly in Washington's favor for once. He decided on a four-pronged strategy in which militia would form the extreme right and left wings of the attack, more as a distraction than anything else. The far right wing was commanded by Maj. Gen. John Armstrong and made up of Potter's Brigade of Pennsylvania Militia, about 1,500 men with four light field pieces, who were to march down the Ridge, or Manatawney Road, escorted by a handful of Philadelphia Light Horse, to strike the Hessian Jäger outpost near Vanderin's Mill. This would occupy Stirn's Brigade of Hessian musket battalions and the Grenadier Battalion von Minnegerode who were holding the far left of the British line on the heights south of Wissahickon Creek above the Falls of Schuylkill.

  On the far left, Smallwood's Maryland Militia, reinforced with Forman's New Jersey Militia, perhaps 1,500 troops, were assigned to move toward Howe's right flank, held by the Queen's Rangers and the Guards. They faced a march of more than twenty miles and a complicated set of directions to get around the Crown Forces. If they were able to make it, these militiamen would appear near Stenton behind the right flank and threaten the rear of the main British camp.

  Gen. John Sullivan commanded the right wing of the main attack with a column made up of his own division of Maryland and Delaware Continentals, plus Hazen's Regiment, about 1,000 men, led by Conway's 3rd Pennsylvania Brigade and supported by the 1st and 2nd Pennsylvania Brigades in Wayne's Division; the three Pennsylvania brigades totaled about 2,000. These troops were to march up the Germantown High Road to take on the left-center of the British line. Washington and his staff would follow this column, ahead of Lord Stirling and the Corps de Reserve, comprising Maxwell's New Jersey Brigade and Nash's North Carolina Brigade, another 1,200 or so regulars.

  The left wing of the main attack was the largest of the four columns and was composed mostly of Virginians. Greene's Division of Weedon's and Muhlenberg's Brigades, 1,500 strong, and Stephen's Division of Scott's and Woodford's Brigades, another 1,500 men, led by McDougall's Brigade of 1,000 newly arrived Connecticut troops, were to move down the Skippack Road into the Whitemarsh Church Road and head into Germantown via the Lime Kiln Road. This would bring them in on an angle to hit the right of the main British camp on the flank and front. “The Reason of our Sending So many Troops to attack their right was because it was supposed That if This wing of the Enemy could be forced, their army must have been pushed into the Sculkill or have been compelled to Surrender,” General Sullivan wrote. “Therefore Two Thirds of the Army at Least were Detached to oppose the Enemys Right.”20

  The Battle of Germantown, by Captain John André. The early-morning attack was the first major offensive of the war made by Washington's main army. Theambitious battle plan called for a simultaneous attack by four columns and failed due to fog, lack of coordination, and stubborn British resistance.

  Washington planned the battle within a remarkably short time, less than two days; his sixteen generals were unanimous in their support of the attack. Surprise was a key element and required an extraordinary amount of discipline and coordination. The distance was a major challenge: to be at their assigned positions in time for the 5 AM attack, the four separated columns of Washington's troops would have to move silently in the dark between fourteen and twenty-five miles over roads that were poorly marked and easily confused to form a front nearly five miles from flank to flank. As events played out, coordination of so many columns over such a spread of terrain was one of the major flaws in the plan.

  “Covet! My Countrymen, and fellow soldiers! Covet! A share of the glory due heroic deeds!” Washington exhorted the men in the General Orders on October 3. “Let it never be said, that in a day of action, you turned your backs on the foe—let the enemy no longer triumph.”

  “They brand you with ignominious epithets,” he told them. “Will you patiently endure that reproach? Will you suffer the wounds given to your Country to go unrevenged? Will you resign your parents—wives—children and friends to be the wretched vassals of a proud, insulting foe?” Washington reminded the army, “General Howe has, within a few days proclaimed, all who had not then submitted, to be beyond the reach of it; and has left us no choice but Conquest or Death.”

  Directing their attention to the recent success of Gates's army against Burgoyne, the commander in chief told the troops, “This army—the main American Army—will certainly not suffer itself to be outdone by their northern Brethren—they will never endure such disgrace; but with an ambition becoming freemen, contending in the most righteous cause, rival the heroic spirit which swelled their bosoms, and which so nobly exerted, has procured them deathless renown.”21 Or, as Cato's son Portius put it to the senator Sempronius:

  And while the Fathers of the Senate meet,

  In close Debate to weigh the Events of War,

  I'll animate the Soldiers’ drooping Courage,

  With Love of Freedom, and Contempt of Life:

  I'll thunder in their Ears their Country's Cause,

  And try to rouse up all that's Roman in ’em.

  ’Tis not in Mortals to command Success,

  But we'll do more, Sempronius! we'll deserve it.22

  “Our dearest rights—our dearest friends—our own lives—honor—glory, and even shame, urge us to the fight,” Washington concluded. “And my fellow soldiers! When an opportunity presents, be firm, be brave, shew yoursel
ves men, and victory is yours.”23

  “Yesterday at noon Washington had once again assured his army, which was up to 20,000 men again, that Burgoyne had been completely defeated,” Captain von Münchhausen wrote on October 4. Further, he reported, Washington told the Continentals “that we had less than 6,000 men in our camp, because so many detachments had been sent to Philadelphia, Wilmington, Billingsport, etc., and that our best troops were in these detachments. This would be the time to defeat us as completely as Burgoyne. And if they would behave like real soldiers, and keep quiet, he promised to lead them into Philadelphia in the morning.”24

  The troops were ordered to leave their packs and baggage in camp. “Early this morning orders were issued for the troops to be furnished with two days cooked provisions, and each man served with forty rounds of ammunition,” Lt. James McMichael of the Pennsylvania State Regiment wrote in his diary. “At noon the sick were sent to Bethlehem, which indicates that a sudden attack is intended,” he noted. “At 6 PM the whole army marched.”25 Lt. James Morris of the 5th Connecticut Regiment in McDougall's Brigade recalled, “I left my baggage and my Bible which my father bought for me when I was six years old, in my trunk. I marched with only my military suit, and my implements of war, without any change of dress or even a blanket. We marched that evening…Samuel Stannard my waiter, a strong athletic man, carried my blanket and provisions with a canteen of Whiskey.”26

  There was to be no noise, no lights, no talking—it was a large-scale replay of the nights before Trenton and Princeton. October 3 was the second day of a New Moon phase, so there was no moonlight. The day had been fair, with sunshine & clouds and a temperature of 69 degrees Fahrenheit recorded at 3 PM near Philadelphia. That night, the temperature dropped into the fifties.27 The skies were cloudy and threatening, blotting out the stars; there was practically no natural light at all. The men were given pieces of white paper to put in their hats so they could see each other in the dark. “Unfortainetly for us the Night proved very dark,” Col. Elias Dayton of the 3rd New Jersey Regiment noted, “which so retarded our march that we did not reach the Enemys Advanced post untill sunrise, whereas our design was to Attack them at first dawn of day.”28